The Tequila Eect hypothesis states that the economic crisis that a ected several South American countries i n 1 9 95 was caused by a n exogenous capital ight triggered by t he loss of condence of foreign investors after the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994. I analyze the Argentine experience before and after the Mexican c r isis and argue that the Tequila Eect played an important role in the 1995 crisis. I model the Tequila Eect in an optimizing, small, open economy, a s a s i t u a t ion in which agents at time 0 learn that at some random future date foreign i n v estors w i l l pull their assets out of the country. The model captures key features of the Argentine crisis of 1995: the decline in aggregate domestic spending and the outow of capital that began in December 1994; the credit crunch and interest rate h i k e o f M arch 1 995; the slow return of the real interest rate to its pre-crisis level, and the protracted decline in output and investment that began in March 1995.
Introduction
In April 1991 the Argentine government e m barked on an ambitious ination-stabilization program| the Convertibility Plan|whose main components w ere an exchange rate peg to the U.S. dollar and a far-reaching structural reform that included expenditure cuts, the privatization of virtually all state-owned enterprises, tax reform, and nancial and trade liberalization. The initial results were impressive: high ination disappeared instantaneously, o utput grew at an average annual r ate of almost 8% between 1991 and 1994, and consumption and investment expanded at even higher rates. At t he same time the trade balance showed large decits and the real exchange rate appreciated.
This economic boom came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the Mexican Peso in December 1994 when a run on the Argentine banking system began that led to a traumatic credit crunch i n M a r c h 1995 and put many n a ncial institutions out of business. The nancial crisis had disastrous real eects: In 1995, output declined 4.5% and gross domestic investment 1 6%; the trade balance turned positive f or the rst time in three years, reecting a contraction in domestic spending; and the real exchange rate showed the rst signs of depreciation as the economy e n tered a deationary phase.
What caused this reversal o f fortunes? One explanation is that a boom-recession cycle is inherent t o exchange-rate based stabilization programs. Empirical studies (Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992; V egh, 1992) have f o und that the eects of exchange-rate based stabilization programs implemented in d i erent c o untries and at dierent points in time are remarkably similar|initial economic expansion, trade balance deterioration and real exchange rate appreciation is followed by recession, trade balance improvement and real depreciation. A vast literature has been devoted to formalizing this explanation and dierent mechanisms have been advanced. 1 3 The author is a sta Economist at International Finance Division of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. I would like to thank Jaime Marquez, Pierre-Richard Ag enor, Stephanie Schmitt-Groh e, and seminar participants at the Inter American Development Bank for helpful comments, and Sherrell Varner for editorial assistance. This paper represents the views of the author and should not be interpreted as reecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or other members of its sta. Address for correspondence: International Finance Division, Stop 24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, (202) 452 3780, e-mail uribem@frb.gov. 1 For early explanations based on reduced-form models with sticky prices and adaptive expectations, see Rodr guez An alternative explanation argues that business cycles in LDCs are to a large extent d r iven by movements in the interest r a te in industrialized countries. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart ( 1993) nd that the international interest rate is a signicant determinant o f t he real exchange rate and of international capital o ws to Latin America. Similarly, Dooley, F ern andez-Arias and Kletzer (1996) nd that the interest rate in developed countries is the main factor explaining movements in the secondary m arket price of foreign public debt of developing countries.
A third possible explanation for the reversal of fortunes is the \Tequila Eect" ( o r \Contagion Eect") h ypothesis, which states that the Argentine crisis of 1995 w as caused the reluctance of foreign investors to renew their loans to the country, resulting from the fear that it would soon follow in Mexico's f o o t steps. According to this hypothesis the change o f c o ndence of f o reign investors was exogenous to the country a nd, moreover, completely unrelated to d o mestic economic fundamentals.
In this paper, I undertake an empirical and theoretical investigation of the Tequila Eect hypothesis. In section 2, I examine the Argentine economic experience since the implementation of the Convertibility Plan in 1991, with emphasis on developments after the Mexican crisis of December 1994. 2 I argue that there w a s a clear T equila Eect in the Argentine crisis of 1995, and that certain elements of that crisis can hardly be explained by either the exchange-rate based stabilization hypothesis or the international i n t erest rate h ypothesis.
In section 3, I present a m o d e l o f a s m a ll, open economy t hat starts out as a net borrower from the rest of the world. As is well known, under the assumption that the rate of time preference equals the international real interest rate, the equilibrium in such a n economy i s c haracterized by a constant l e v el of c o nsumption and a positive trade balance large enough t o service the (constant) net foreign debt. I refer to this scenario as the crisis-free equilibrium. I then model the Tequila Eect as a situation in which a t some point, say period 0, domestic residents learn that at some future date foreign investors will decide to hold no domestic assets. I consider rst the simple case of a perfect foresight, endowment economy, and then introduce uncertainty a b o ut the ti m e o f t h e pull out, and capital accumulation. Under perfect foresight domestic residents learn in period 0 the exact date, say period T, a t which f o reign investors will pull out of t he country. In this case, consumption falls in period 0 and stays constant through period T at a level such t hat the stock o f d e bt in period T is 0. In period T + 1, consumption jumps up to the endowment l e v el and stays at that level thereafter. The domestic interest rate is constant and equal to the international interest rate b e t w e e n p e r i o d s 0 a nd T 01, jumps up in period T , and returns to its initial level in period T + 1 . 3 (1982) and Dornbusch (1982) . For models of temporary stabilization and imperfect credibility, see Calvo (1986 Calvo ( , 1987 and further developments by Helpman (1987, 1988) , Calvo and V egh (1993) , Reinhart and V egh (1995) , and Mendoza and Uribe (1996) , among many others. For supply-side explanations see Uribe (1993 ), Rold os (1995 and Lahiri (1995) . Rebelo and V egh (1995) provide a survey of this literature.
2 Calvo and Reinhart (1996) analyze cross country data on asset returns to identify c o n tagion eects in nancial crisis. 3 The assumption that foreign investors pull completely out of the country is made for simplicity but is by no This simple setup captures some key elements o f the Argentine nancial crisis of 1995, n a mely, the capital outow that started right after the Mexican crisis in December 1994, the corresponding trade balance improvement, and the interest rate hike of March 1995. But it leaves out other important a s pects of the data, in particular, the fact that a t t he time of the credit crunch i n M arch 1995, the decline in aggregate demand that had started three months before greatly deepened, generating a signicant improvement in the trade balance in the second quarter of 1995. To capture this feature of t he crisis I analyze, in section 4, a version of the model in which domestic agents are uncertain about the time at w hich foreign investors will actually stop renewing their loans to the country. In this case, the credit crunch, although not completely unexpected, comes partly as a surprise and therefore induces a contraction i n a ggregate domestic spending.
A second aspect of the data that the basic model is unable to c a pture i s t he fact that although real interest rates came down substantially after the March 1995 peak, they stayed consistently above their pre-Mexican crisis levels through the rest of 1995 and beyond. The two v ersions of the model described above p r edict, contrary to t his fact, an immediate return of the interest rate to its pre-crisis level. In section 5, I extend the model by a llowing for capital accumulation. In this version of the model the slow convergence of the interest rate occurs as follows: the interest rate hike in period T causes a decline in investment, implying that the economy starts period T + 1 w i t h a l o w er stock o f p h ysical capital. From period T + 1 o n the economy i s i s o lated from the international capital market and therefore c o llapses to the standard closed-economy, neoclassical growth model, which predicts t hat i f t he initial stock of capital is below its steady-state l e v el, the capital stock converges monotonically from below to its long-run level and the interest rate, given by t he marginal product of capital, converges monotonically from above. The decline in output that this third version of the model predicts is consistent w i t h t he recession observed in 1995 and, in particular, with the fact that the recession s t arted after the interest rate h i k e i n M arch 1995.
Argentina Before and After t h e M e xican Crisis
The Argentine economic policy of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by scal i r responsibility and repeated attempts to stabilize prices. Because of chronic scal i m balances, each stabilization program resulted in higher ination and greater public debt. When President C arlos Menem took oce in July 1989, the situation w a s a t a critical point. In the rst half of t hat y ear, prices grew at an a v erage monthly rate of 38% (gure 1) and the scal decit was above 2 0 % of GDP (table 1).
2.1
The Convertibility P l an and Structural Reforms
The two m a in elements of the stabilization strategy adopted by the Menem administration were a xed exchange rate regi m e a n d a f a r-reaching scal reform. The \Convertibility Act," passed by C o ngress in March 1991, established a one-to-one exchange rate between the Argentine peso means necessary. All results carry out under the assumption of partial pull out. and t he U.S. dollar, eliminated all exchange and capital controls, and required that most of the monetary base be backed by i n ternational reserves. 4 The scal reform had four main components: tax r eform, cuts i n g o v ernment s pending, a v ast privatization program, and reductions in the domestic and foreign public debt. As a result of an aggressive reform of the value-added tax which widened the tax base and fought e v asion by computerizing the tax-collection system and increasing the number of random inspections of businesses, revenues from the value-added tax increased from 4% o f G DP in 1990 to 5.5% in 1991 a nd 8.5% in 1992. Expenditure c u t s came mainly from a drastic reduction in public employment, which i n 1 9 89 accounted for 40% of the federal administration's budget. Between April 1990 and December 1991 federal g o v ernment e m ployment w as cut 23.3% ( table 2) . Around 70% o f this reduction was achieved through a freeze on lling vacancies and the remainder came through a v oluntary early retirement program that included severance pay.
Between 1989 and 1992, 5 1 s t a te-owned enterprises were privatized generating, approximately $18 billion in cash and debt-reduction schemes. Income from this source represented 0.6% o f G DP in 1990, 1.6% in 1991, and 1.2% in 1992. The revenue from t he sale of a ssets w as not t he only way by which privatizations contributed to the reduction of the scal decit: Ineciencies in the administration of these enterprises together with politically determined prices, had resulted in systematic losses of around 4% of GDP (Edwards, 1996) .
From 1989 to 1990 i n t erest payments on t he public debt (l i n e s 4 a n d 6 o f table 1) fell by 1 6% of GDP. The decline resulted from a series of controversial measures by which the government defaulted on most o f t he domestic public debt. 5 In addition, in 1991 t he country, under the Brady Plan, reach e d a f o reign debt reduction agreement b y which the external debt|$ 61 billion a t t hat time|was reduced about 9% and was nanced at l o w er rates and longer, mostly 30-year, maturities. Initial Boom: 1991 -1994 The Convertibility Plan succeeded in quickly stopping high ination. The average monthly CPI ination rate fell from 11.4% in the 12 months preceding the announcement of the plan to 2 .2% in the 12 m o n ths following the announcement, 1 .4% in 1992, . 6% in 1993, and .4% in 1994 ( gure 1) . In spite of its steady decline, ination stayed signicantly above the rate of devaluation during the rst four years o f t he plan, and, as a consequence, the real exchange rate steadily appreciated. The relative price of t radables in terms of nontradables, as measured by the CPI-adjusted exchange rate 4 The charter of the central bank establishes that its holdings of government bonds cannot exceed 20 percent of international reserves. 5 The repudiation process began on the rst business day of 1990 with the implementation of the \Bonex plan." Under the plan, the government eliminated the decit of the central bank The decit of the central bank|also referred to as quasi-scal decit|totaled in 1989 6% of GDP, and originated in interest payments, at market rates, on required reserves on time deposits. (Reserve requirements on time deposits w ere around 80% by that time.) The Bonex Plan forced depositors to exchange their time deposits for government bonds (bonex) in such terms that the public lost above 70% of the real value of their deposits. A similar strategy was applied to reduce the debt of the non-nancial public sector.
The
between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar fell almost 25% between April 1991 and December 1994 (gure 2).
The initial phase of the plan w as also characterized by a boom in output, consumption, and investment and by a large deterioration in the trade balance. Figure 3 shows annual observations for GDP and for the ratio of consumption, investment, and the trade balance to GDP for the period 1980-1995. During the pre-Mexican-crisis phase of the Convertibility Plan GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.7%, total consumpti o n a t 8 .7%, and gross domestic investment a t 2 1 .8%. 6 At the same time, imports grew at an average annual rate o f 40.5% while exports expanded at only 3.0% per year, consequently, the trade balance deteriorated from a surplus of 6.6% of GDP in 1990 to a decit of 4.8% of GDP i n 1 994.
The 1995 Financial Crisis
The rapid pace of economic expansion in the rst four years of the Convertibility Plan ended abruptly with the Mexican crisis of December1994. At t hat time a major nancial crisis developed as the public began a massive withdrawal of bank deposits|rst of peso-denominated deposits and then of dollar-denominated deposits (gure 4). Total peso-and dollar-denominated bank deposits, which h a d grown at an a v erage annual rate of 5 7% between 1991 and 1994, declined at an annual rate of 62% in the rst three months of 1995. To fulll their customers' demands, banks were forced to stop making new loans (gure 5). As a result, total loans, which b e t w een 1991 and 1994 had grown at an average annual r a te of 30%, declined in the rst quarter of 1995 a t a n a n n ual rate o f 1 3 % . T h i s l i q u idity crisis led to a rise in interest rates. The prime rate rose from an average o f 10% for peso-denominated loans and 8% for dollar-denominated loans over the period June 1993-December 1994 t o a peak of 33% for peso-denominated loans and 22% for dollar-denominated loans in March 1 9 95 (gure 6. 7 The interest rate hike, in turn, had a devastating eect on the stock market (gure 7).
The decline in bank deposits was accompanied by a s t rong preference for foreign currency which led to a sharp reduction in the stock o f foreign reserves held by the central bank (gure 8). I n trying to cope with t his situation, the monetary authority in December of 1994 l o w ered reserve requirements from 4 3 % t o 3 3% for checkable deposits and from 3% t o 1 % f o r t ime deposits. O n M a rch 1 , 1 9 95, the government b y decree, changed the charter of the central bank and granted the institution wide exibility a nd discretion in providing liquidity, including the ability t o acquire portfolios o f b a n k s i n n a ncial stress. This drastic change in monetary policy meant t hat the central bank became de facto a lender of last resort. In the two w eeks following the change, the central bank engaged in a massive expansion of domestic credit aimed at sterilizing the ongoing decline in the monetary base (gure 9). Between March 1 a nd March 14, 1995, i n ternational reserves fell $2 billion and the central bank sterilized 40% o f t he decline; in contrast, in the rst two months of the year (Januar y 2 t o F ebruary 28), f o reign reserves fell $2.5 billion and the central bank sterilized only 13% of the decline.
The c r edit crunch in the rst quarter of 1995 marked the end of four years of economic growth following the initiation of the Convertibility Plan in April 1991. Industrial production g rew 4% (4-quarter rate) in the rst quarter of 1995 but fell drastically in the second and third quarters|4.6% and 9.5% respectively|(gure 10). The signicant improvement i n t he trade balance observed in 1995 (gure 11) reects a slowdown in aggregate domestic absorption.
On March 1 4, the government announced that it had regained access to credit through i n ternational nancial institutions such a s t he IMF ($2.4 billion), the World Bank ($1.3 billion), and the IADB ($1.5 billion), and private foreign lenders ( $ 1 billion). It also obtained a three-year $ l billion loan from domestic entrepreneurs (the \patriotic" bond). On the same d a y , the government announced an austerity plan that included, among other measures, an increase in the value added tax rate from 18% t o 2 1 %, imposition of a 3 % i m p o rt tax, the elimination of export subsidies, and expenditure cuts o f $ 1 billion. These announcements played an important role in containing the nancial crisis. In the second quarter of 1 9 95, bank deposits began to recover gradually and interest rates started to come d o wn. However, total deposits and loans did not reach t heir pre-crisis levels in 1995. Similarly, t he interest rate remained above its pre-Mexican crisis level throughout 1995. As a consequence of the nancial crisis, in 1995 t he Argentine economy sunk into a recession of major proportions with GDP falling 4.5%, and gross domestic investment 16%.
Discussion
The data show a clear relation between the timing of the Mexican and Argentine crises. Could this correlation be due to a common exogenous factor? As pointed out above, empirical studies have f o und that the interest rate in industrialized countries is the most important e x t ernal factor aecting capital ows to Latin America (Calvo e t a l., 1993; Dooley et al., 1996) . Figure 12 shows the U.S. intended federal funds rate for the period January, 1 9 93 to May, 1996. The federal funds rate was constant a t 3 % f r om the beginning of the sample period until January, 1994. A t ightening period started in February, 1994 when the Federal Reserve raised the intended federal funds rate 2 5 b a sis points. By June, 1994, the federal funds rate stood at 4 . 25% and by D ecember at 5.5%. The last increase of that tightening period occurred in February, 1995 when the federal funds rate w as increased by 50 basis points to 6%. An explanation of the Argentine crisis of 1995 based on movements in the interest rate in industrialized countries would suggest that t he capital outow p r ocess that initiated the crisis should have started ear l y i n 1 9 94, when the U.S. monetary authority began raising interest rates, rather than i n J a n uary, 1 9 95, when most analysts were already anticipating the end of the tightening period.
Another explanation mentioned above argues that a boom-recession cycle is inherent t o e x c hangerate based stabilization programs like t he Argentine Convertibility Plan. The temporariness or imperfect credibility h ypothesis (Calvo, 1 986; Calvo and V egh, 1993) says that if ination acts a s a tax o n domestic spending, t hen a reduction in ination perceived as temporary by economic agents will induce a substitution of current f o r future domestic spending, causing trade balance deterioration, real appreciation, and ination. The increase in current domestic spending occurs because agents take advantage o f the temporary reduction in the ination tax. If at some point a fter the implementation of the stabilization program either the devaluation rate is permanently increased or agents learn that the stabilization program is permanent, the incentives for i n tertemporal substitution disappear and consumption falls to t he level consistent with permanent income. Could these be the forces behind the 1995 Argentine recession? Under perfect foresight, the imperfect credibility hypothesis implies that the interest rate on dollar-denominated deposits i s a lways equal to the international i n terest rate (Calvo, 1986; Calvo and V egh, 1993) . Adding uncertainty m a y i n t roduce an upward slopping path for the nominal interest rate on domestic-currency-denominated assets if the probability of abandonment of the plan increases as the moment of resolution of uncertainty i s a p p r o a c h e d , b u t the interest rate on dollar-denominated assets is, as in the perfect foresight c a se, always equal to the international interest rate (Mendoza and Uribe, 1996) . Therefore, the imperfect credibility h ypothesis can explain the increase in the spread between peso and dollar interest rates, but not the escalation in dollar rates that occurred the rst quarter of 1 995.
Although elements of the two a lternative h ypothesis discussed above could have been present in the Argentine crisis of 1995, they can hardly explain its t iming nor the dramatic rise in real interest r a tes in the rst quarter of 1995. The Consider a perfect-foresight economy populated by a l a r ge number of identical, innitely lived consumers with preferences dened over sequences of consumption of a perishable, internationally traded good, c t , and described by t he utility function 1 X t=0 t U(c t )
where 2 (0; 1) denotes the subjective discount f actor and U(1) denotes the period utility function, assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously dierentiable.
In each period t 0, the consumer is endowed with y units of the good and has access to a bond, b t , that pays the real interest rate r t in period t + 1 . T hroughout, the consumer is assumed to enter period 0 with s ome debt carried over from period 01. The consumer's budget constraint is then given by b t = ( 1 + r t 0 1 ) b t 0 1 + y 0 c t (2) given (1 + r t01 )b 01 < 0:
The consumer chooses sequences of consumption and bond holdings s o a s t o m aximize his utility function subject to (2) and to a borrowing constraint of the form 
that prevents him from engaging in Ponzi-type games. The optimal paths fc t ; b t +1 g satisfy (2) a nd the following Euler and transversality conditions: 
Crisis-free Equilibrium
Suppose that agents h a v e access to the international nancial market, where the interest r a te, r 3 , is constant and satises (1 + r 3 ) = 1 .
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In this case, the equilibrium conditions are obtained by substituting r 3 for r t in (2){(5) 
The Tequila Eect
By the \Tequila Eect," or \exogenous nancial c r isis," I mean a situation in which a t s ome point, say period 0, domestic agents learn that foreign i n v estors wish to pull their assets out of the country by time T > 0. 10 Formally, the Tequila Eect sets in when domestic agents learn, at t = 0 , t hat for t T , b t must be greater than or equal to b, where b > b 0 1 and b t denotes aggregate net foreign asset holdings in period t.
11
For simplicity, I a ssume that b = 0 , t hat is, that foreign investors wish to hold no assets i n v ested in the domestic economy as of period T . Because before period T the country is not subject to a n y borrowing constraint, the equilibrium domestic interest rate must be equal to the international interest rate for 0 t < T . F rom period T on, the domestic interest rate m ust be greater than or equal to the international interest rate.
12
A competitive equilibrium is then a set of sequences fc t ; b t ; r t g 1 t =0 satisfying the consumer's o ptimality conditions (2){(5) and the restrictions r t = r 3 t < T (6) r t r 3 , b t 0, (r t 0 r 3 )b t = 0t T
Equations (4) a nd (6) imply that consumption is constant b e t w een periods 0 and T, at a level denoted b y c 3 3 . B e c a u se the initial stock of assets is negative ((1 + r 01 )b 01 < 0) and the stock of assets in period T must be non-negative ( b T 0), c 33 must be less than c 3 , the consumption level under the crisis-free equilibrium, in order for the trade balan c e t o b e l a r ge enough not only to service the debt but also to cover some amortization each period. It can be shown that the equilibrium conditions (2)- (7) 10 Throughout the paper the behavior of foreign investors is taken as given. Calvo (1995) , using a partial equilibrium model of optimal portfolio management, provides theoretical arguments for why i t m i g h t be optimal for foreign investors to behave in a fashion consistent w i t h the Tequila Eect hypothesis.
11 Note that the notation does not distinguish between individual and aggregate net asset holdings. I assume that the borrowing constraint is imposed on the aggregate level of net asset holdings rather than on individual net asset holdings. Because consumers are assumed to be identical, however, this distinction does not aect the equilibrium. The distinction would make a dierence if agents were assumed to be heterogeneous in preferences or endowments.
12 The domestic interest rate may not be lower than the international interest rate, for such a situation would allow agents to make innite prots by exploiting arbitrage opportunities.
13 The uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium can be seen by noting that conditions (2)- (7) are identical to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the social planner's problem of maximizing the utility function (1) subject to bt (1 + r 3 )bt01 + y 0 ct bt 0 t T given r 3 b01 < 0. This problem, in turn, has a unique solution because the objective function is strictly concave a n d the budget set is convex.
The equilibr ium paths of foreign capital ows, the interest rate, and consumption a re illustrated in gure 6. F oreign capital starts owing out of the country at the beginning of period zero and ows at an increasing rate u n til period T, when there is an interest rate hike a nd the country goes into autarky. I n terestingly, the jump in the interest rate occurs only in period T, though all the information about foreign investors' loss of condence is revealed in period 0. The capital ight is accompanied by a corresponding improvement in the trade balan c e i n p e r i o d 0 t hat l a sts until period T . Note that the equilibrium is unaected by w hether the decision by foreign investors t o pull out in period T is permanent or transitory i n t he sense that whether or not a g ents can borrow from the rest of the world from period T + 1 on is immaterial for the behavior o f t he variables of the model. Which f eatures of the Argentine recessi o n o f 1 9 9 5 are captured by t he Tequila Eect model? If one thinks of t = 0 a s December 1994, when the Mexican crisis occurred, and of t = T as March 1995, when the interest rate hike occurred, the Tequila Eect hypothesis explains three important aspects of the 1995 Argentine recession: the sudden improvement in the trade balance in the rst quarter of 1995; the capital ight that started in late December 1994 a nd that was reected in the loss of reserves b y the central bank and the decline in both peso-and dollar-denominated bank deposits; and the interest rate h i k e i n M arch 1995, which marked the end of the initial phase of the crisis.
However, the simple model of t he Tequila Eect fails to explain the observed deepening of the contraction i n a ggregate domestic absorpti o n a t t he time of the interest rate hike. Instead, the model predicts a constant t rade balance between periods 0 and T and a deterioration in period T + 1 as consumption jumps to the endowment l e v el.
Uncertain Timing of Crisis
In this section, I modify the baseline model by a ssuming that t he time at which t he domestic economy i s s u b j e c t t o t he aggregate borrowing constraint is uncertain. This modication seeks to capture the deepening of the contraction in aggregate domestic absorption and the widening of the trade balance observed in Argentina at the time of the interest rate h i k e i n M arch 1995.
Assume that there exists an exogenous random variable s t that takes the value 1 if the aggregate borrowing constraint is in place and 0 otherwise. 14 That is, if s t = 1 , t hen b t 0 ( but not necessarily the other way around, because the country's net foreign asset holdings can in principle be voluntarily non-negative a t a n y t ime). Also assume that the borrowing constraint is imposed for sure n o l a ter than period T and that once the aggregate borrowing constraint is imposed it remains in place forever. F ormally, the random variable s t is assumed to satisfy P r ( s t = 1 j s t 0 1 = 1 ) = 1 8 t a nd P r ( s t = 1 ) = 1 f or t T .
In this case, the equilibrium conditions are given by equation ( 2) and the following modied 14 The methodology used in this section follows Drazen and Helpman (1988) and Calvo and Drazen (1993) . version of conditions (4){ (7) U 0 (c t ) = (1 + r t )E t U 0 (c t+1 ); 
The second expression in (10) s tates that if the borrowing constraint i s n o t i n p l a ce, the domestic interest r ate must be equal to the international interest rate r 3 ; the last expression in (10) states that aggregate net asset holdings must be non-negative at the moment t he aggregate borrowing constraint is imposed. In characterizing the dynamics arising from these equilibrium conditions, it is useful to introduce some notation to d i s t inguish the values taken by c t , b t and r t in a pre-crisis period (s t = 0 ) from those taken by c t , b t and r t in the crisis period (s t = 1 j s t 0 1 = 0 ). Let c As shown in the bottom left panel of the gure, consumption f alls not only in period 0|as i n the perfect foresight case|but also at the time of t he crisis. The second decline is represented by the vertical distance between the solid and the broken lines. Consumption recovers one period after the crisis. B e c a u s e a t t h i s p o int t he economy is in autarky, c o nsumption jumps to the endowment level. Before the crisis consumption is increasing over time, reecting the positive income eect associated with the non-occurrence of the interest rate hike. This increase is represented by the vertical distance between the broken and the chain-dotted lines. The domestic interest rate is equal to the international i n t erest rate until the moment a t which the aggregate borrowing constraint i s imposed, and then it jumps up. Note that t he interest rate hike i s m o r e p r onounced the earlier the borrowing constraint i s i m posed. Finally, capital outows a re positive and increasing over time, and they jump up when the borrowing constraint is imposed.
The i n t uition behind these results i s t he following: I n a n y period 0 < t < T 0 1 in which the borrowing constraint has not yet been imposed, the probability t hat i t w i l l b e i m posed in period t + 1 is less than 1. Because consumers are assumed to be net borrowers from the rest o f t he world, it is optimal for them to s a v e less than if they knew that the borrowing constraint will be imposed for sure in t + 1 but more than if they knew for sure that it will not be imposed. If the aggregate borrowing constraint is imposed in period t+ 1 , a g ents ex post undersaved and hence have to adjust their consumption downward. If, o n t he other hand, the borrowing constraint is not imposed in period t + 1 ,a gents ex post oversaved and decide to spend part of that excess savings in the current period. This explains why c o nsumption increases over time before the interest rate hike a nd falls in the period of the interest rate h i k e.
The following proposition provides a formal characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Under Uncertain Timing of Crisis)
Let c t , b t , and r t denote consumption, net aggregate asset holdings, and the domestic real interest rate in period t respectively. Let b 01 < 0. L et s t be a n e x o g enous random variable taking values in f0;1g such that P r ( s t = 1 ) = 1 for t T and P r ( s t = 1 j s t 0 1 = 1 ) = 1 for t 1. L et c ( 2) and (8)- (10) Proof: See the appendix.
The Tequila Eect in a Production Economy
The two versions of the Tequila Eect model analyzed thus far capture several a spects facts of the Argentine recession of 1995 but leave o t her important f a cts unexplained. For example, the models predict that the real i n terest rate jumps at the time at which f o reign investors pull out of the domestic economy and returns immediately to i t s pre-crisis level. However, the data shows that after the interest rate hike i n M arch 1 995, i n t erest rates came down slowly and remained above their pre-crisis levels throughout 1995 (gure 6). Also, because they consider endowment economies, the models presented thus far say nothing about the behavior o f o utput and investment, though the data shows that after the credit crunch o f M arch 1 9 95, output and investment declined sharply, a nd that, a s s h o wn in gure 10, the slowdown in output continued through 1995. I n t his section, I augment the baseline model with p r oduction and capital accumulation and argue that this variation has the ability to qualitatively capture the observed behavior of the real interest rate, output, and investment.
Consider the same structure described in section 3 but assume that output, y t , instead of being exogenously given, is produced with p h ysical capital, k t , which depreciates at the constant r ate (1 + r 0 1 ) b 0 1 < 0and k 0 > 0 Households choose sequences of consumption, capital and bonds so as to maximize the utility function (1) subject to (3), (11), (12), and the initial conditions for bond holdings and capital, taking as given the sequence for the real interest rate. The rst order conditions associated with this problem are equations (4), (5), (11), (12), and the following condition stating that in each period the household invests until the next period's marginal p r oduct of capital equals the current real interest rate f 0 (k t+1 ) = 1 + r t :
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences fc t ; b t ; r t ; k t+1 g 1 t=0 satisfying these rst order conditions and expressions (7) and (6). Expressions (7) and (6) reect the restrictions on r t and b t imposed by the aggregate borrowing constraint in place from period T on. It can be shown t hat these equilibrium conditions have a unique solution.
15 Figure 15 shows t he equilibrium paths of the variables of interest. As in the endowment economy, consumption falls in period 0 and foreign capital starts t o o w out of the economy. Between periods 0 and T 0 1 the interest rate is constant and equal to the international interest rate r 3 , implying that consumption and investment are also constant during this period (see equations (4) and (13)). In period T the interest rate jumps up, provoking a decline in investment. Therefore the economy starts period T + 1 w ith a lower stock o f capital. Because from this point o n the country is unable to borrow f r om the rest of the world, the dynamics toward the steady state are i d e n t ical to those in a closed economy. T h us, the capital stock converges gradually and from below t o k 3 , and the interest rate, given by t he marginal product of capital, converges monotonically and from above t o r 3 .
T h e p r e diction of a slow return of the interest rate to its p r e-crisis level is a key dierence with those of an endowment economy which predict an i n terest rate jumps in period T but an immediate return to i t s l o ng-run level r 3 . 16 Thus, allowing for capital accumulation helps explain 15 As in the case of the endowment economy, the proof of this statement f ollows from the fact that the equilibrium conditions (4)- (7) and (11)- (13) are identical to those associated with the planner's problem of maximizing (1) subject to bt (1 + r 3 )bt01 + f(kt) 0 ct 0 kt+1 k t+1 0 bt 0 t T which has a unique solution because the objective function is strictly concave and the budget set is convex.
16 As noted in section 4, the interest rate also returns immediately to r 3 in the endowment economy model with uncertain timing of crisis. the p r olonged period of high real i n terest rates observed in Argentina after the Mexican crisis of December 1994. Finally, both this model with perfect-foresight and capital accumulation and the endowment-economy model with uncertain timing of crisis predict an improvement in the trade balance driven by a contraction in aggregate domestic spending at the moment a t w hich t he country becomes subject to the borrowing constraint. However, the nature of this improvement i n t he trade balance is quite dierent in the two cases. Under uncertain timing of crisis the improvement i s d u e e n t i r e l y t o a d e c l i n e i n c o nsumption. In the model with perfect-foresight a nd capital accumulation, consumption does not fall in period T but investment does, owing to t he increase in the interest rate.
The following proposition provides a formal characterization of the equilibrium:
Proposition 2 The sequences fc t ; b t ; r t ; k t + 1 g 1 t =0 satisfying the equilibrium conditions (4)- (7)) and (11)- (13) are given by c t = c 333 < c 01 for t T, c t = f(k t ) 0 s(k t ) for t > T , k t+1 = k 3 for t < T , k T +1 < k 3 , k t < k t +1 = s(k t ) < k 3 for t > T , r t = r 3 f or t < T , r t = f 0 ( k t + 1 ) > r 3 for t T , 
U 0 (c 333 )
and s (1) is the familiar closed e c onomy neoclassical savings function, that is, for any k 0 > 0 k t+1 = s(k t ) solves the following dierence e quation
Proof: See the appendix.
Conclusion
December 1994 marked the end of four years of extraordinary economic expansion of the Argentine economy under the Convertibility Plan. According to t he Tequila Eect (or Contagion Eect) hypothesis, the nancial and economic crises that followed had their roots in the collapse of the Mexican peso which undermined foreign investors' condence about the prospects for sustained stability and growth in Argentina and other Latin American countries and led to m assive capital outows. Several conclusions arise from the empirical and theoretical investigation of the Tequila Eect that I perform in this paper. First, the empirical analysis suggests that the Tequila Eect played an important role in the 1995 crisis. Second, the two m ost popular explanations of business cycles in developing countries are shown to be unable to fully account for the developments f o llowing the Mexican crisis of 1995: the explanation based on m o v ements in international interest rates as the main determinant o f economic uctuations in LDCs fails to explain the timing of th crisis, because while international interest rates began rising in early 1994, international capital started to ow out of Argentina in early 1995. An explanation based on imperfect credibility about the exchange rate policy fails to explain the dramatic increase in interest rates on dollar-denominated loans and deposits that took place in the rst q u a rter of 1995.
Finally, the predictions of a simple model of the Tequila Eect in which domestic residents expect that at some point i n t he future foreign investors will stop renewing their loans to the country are shown to be consistent w ith many aspects of the Argentine recession of 1 995, n a mely, the capital outows right a f ter the Mexican crisis, the corresponding trade balance improvement, and the interest rate h i k e i n M arch 1995. Adding to the basic model uncertainty about the time at which foreign i n v estors will actually pull out helps capture the deepening of the contraction in aggregate domestic spending that occurred at the time of the credit crunch o f March 1995. Allowing for capital accumulation helps explain the observed slow return of the real interest rate to its pre-crisis level and the prolonged slowdown in output and investment. (e) Statement (e) follows directly from the Euler equation U 0 (c c t ) = (1+r c t )U 0 (y) and the facts that c c t is less than y and is increasing over time.
Pro o f o f P r oposition 2:
It is sucient t o s how t hat r t r 3 t T and that c 333 < c 0 1 , for all other equilibrium conditions are satised by construction. Equation (13) implies that r t r 3 t T if and only if k t+1 k 3 for t T . In turn, it is a well-known result that the system (16){(17) implies that k t will converge monotonically to k 3 from below i f a nd only if k T +1 k 3 . I n o w show t hat equations (14) and (15) (14) and (15) individually. Because b T01 is a decreasing function o f c 333 , equation (14) implies that k T+1 is a decreasing function of c 333 . This relation is shown as line LL' on the gure. Also, because c 01 = r 3 b01 + f ( k 3 ), we have t hat for c 333 = c 01 , the value of k T+1 that satises (14) i s k 3 + b 0 1 (point a on the gure).
On the other hand, because f(1) 0 s(1) i s a s trictly increasing function, it follows that the right hand side of (15) is a decreasing function of k T+1 . Therefore, equation (15) GOVERNMENT (1985 GOVERNMENT ( -1992 (in percentage o f GDP) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 6. Surplus of the Central Bank -2.8 -1.6 -0.9 -0.7 -5.9 -1.0 -0.5 -0.2 7. Total Surplus of the Public Sector (5+6) -6.6 -4.3 -6.5 -7.3 -20.5 -3.6 -1.7 1.0 8. Surplus of the Public sector before sales of assets (7-2) -6.8 -4.4 -6.7 -7.5 -20.8 -4.2 -3.1 -0.2 Source: Argentine Ministry of Economics. 
